The U.S. National Interest in Latin America

The U.S. national interest, succinctly put, is the states’s most vital needs which represent the whole society. Through the concept of common identity we can derive both the perception of society and the representative nature of vital interest concerns. Before defining America’s specific national interests though, one final concept must be understood, that of national interest classification. Joseph Frankel’s national interest classification is a useful tool toward this end. He separates national interests into Aspirational, operational, explanatory, and polemical categories. The defining characteristics of these categories help correlate national interests with foreign policy actions, thus offering a clearer picture of the interests themselves.

Frankel defines aspirational interests as “...the vision of the good life, ... some ideal set of goals which the state would like to realize if this were possible.” (Joseph Frankel, National Interest, 1970, p. 31.). These interests may not be actively pursued, but are still politically relevant. This category is helpful in highlighting the general direction desired by a nation or state. Given the opportunity and capabilities, they may shift to the next category, operational interests. Lars Schoultz points our (although not in these terms) that United States policy makers placed great importance on this concept in relation to the Soviet Union in Latin America. (Lars Schoultz, National Security and United States Policy Toward Latin America, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987, p. 109.) Most United States policy makers today know they would be incorrect in putting first priority importance (immediate operational significance) on Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez’ anti American populist agenda in Latin America for example, but would be incorrect in not considering it at all. With the right circumstances, Chavez, Bolivia’s Evo Morales, Nicaragua's Daniel Ortega, and until recently, Honduras’ Manuel Zelaya have displayed the willingness to make this goal operational. In short, political will rather than capabilities determines aspirational interests and are an outgrowth of perceived power or are “daydreams” of the powerless. Chavez’ petro fueled populism has nearly drained the coffers and he suffers a less than 50 percent approval rating. Zelaya was removed from power in a military coup. Ortega is in desperate need of international aid. Ecuador's Rafael Correa, and Argentina’s Cristina Fernandez and her husband, Nestor Kirchner, which unofficially identify with the populist movement are also on the ropes. Only Morales, who is his country’s first indigenous President, enjoys continued popularity. Even in these hard times, Brazil's Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, Chile's Michelle Bachelet and Uruguay's Tabare Vazquez , who have distanced themselves from Chavez’ more belligerent policies, are enjoying strong support. So even with populist leaders on the ropes, their aspirational interests are driving them to manipulations to hold onto power. The United States, on the other hand, has no aspirational interest to concern them presently as it was so preoccupied with the Soviet Union’s influence in Latin America three or four decades ago.

“On the operational level, national interest refers to the sum total of interests and policies actually pursued.” (Frankel, p.32.) These interests are determined by capabilities rather than political will. Friction is inevitable between these two levels due to their differing characteristics (see Frankel for more details), divergence between aspirations, and concrete results, institutional tensions between policy makers and policy executors, and generally how these interests evolve. Operational interests are derived inductively, by adding up single elements, with overriding concern on implementation and cost. Aspirational interests, on the other hand, are the product of deductive reasoning, with principles as the guiding force, usually without considering cost or implementation. Political actors use the explanatory and polemical categories of national interests to explain, evaluate, rationalize and criticize actual foreign policy. Official statements, documents, debates, and media discussion are sources of these categories. The explanatory level supports the present policy, while the polemical level argues for change. Although these last two categories are the most prolific sources of data, they may also be the most misleading indicators of actual national interest because of hidden agendas, nuances of political rhetoric, tradition, etc.

The aspirational national interests of the United States, as derived form the common identity, are:
• Preserve and protect the Madisonian Model
• Preserve and protect the right to progress, in domestic political liberalization, domestic and foreign market expansion, and democratic expansion beyond the borders in order to maintain our “great nation” status and leader (moral and economic) of the world. The rhetoric has been toned down significantly since the departure of the neo-conservatives from direct execution power.
• Preserve and protect the right to self-actualization (to make real choices beyond social and economic freedom).

On an operational level, United States national interests consist of:
• Maintenance of political and economic stability
• Stopping terrorism and insurgency
• Establishment of solidarity of interests and actions with allies

Within the context of Latin America, the links between the American common identity and American national interests become clearer. U.S. aspirational interests most closely parallel the metaphysical values in the American experiment. We view our ties with Latin America as a “special relationship.” The Western Hemisphere is the “new country,” separated from the “old world.” Democracy and freedom are for all mankind, and our closest neighbors should benefit from what we have accomplished. Within this aspirational framework are tow general categories of ideas: the Western Hemisphere idea and the Democratic Mission idea. The Western Hemisphere idea encompasses notable foreign policy actions such as the No Transfer Policy (1811), the Monroe Doctrine (1823, the Pan American Movement (1880), the Good Neighbor Policy (1920-1945), the RIO Pact (1947), the Organization of American States (1948), the Alliance for Progress (1960), and the Caribbean Basin Initiative (1983-Present). In actuality, western hemisphere solidarity is very illusionary. Some have even suggested it is just a front for sponsoring a more rigid, hegemonic relationship such as the sphere of influence concept. Under the Democratic Mission concept are President Wilson’s stand on Mexico and its revolution, President Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress/democratization initiatives, President Carter’s human rights initiatives, and the democratization initiatives of Presidents Reagan and George Bush. Many see the Latin America legacies of Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush as missed opportunities. President Obama’s first months in office suggest a possible renewed interest in Latin America. His Op-Ed article published in most large papers in Latin America, Choosing a Better Future in the Americas and attendance at the Summit of the Americas both received an enthusiastic welcome. He will have to do more than listen in relation to issues like the recent Honduran coup. Again, contradictions seem to suggest the Democratic Mission is also mostly illusion.
On the operational level, Latin America highlights some of the key concepts of our common identity. First, because of our “low state,” “low class” foundation, foreign policy in this area of the world has been fairly unconstrained. Only a select few interest groups, ad hoc groups and pressure groups are concerned with specifics in the region. Riker’s minimalist coalition building model applies here, causing a partial breakdown in the Madisonian Model. Mr. Kissinger famously summed up the general feeling toward Latin America (in terms of operational national interests) when he said in 1969, “What ever happens in the South is of no importance.” U.S. interests have predominantly been East-West in orientation, and even the “important” Latin American interests are connected to the outlook. Historically then, our operational interests have centered on three issues: security, economics, and politics. Due to our common identity, these issues are translated to mean stability. Instability has been seen as a threat to security, the free market capitalism, and as an exploitable opportunity to our political and ideological enemies. This fear of insecurity, combined with “low stateness” (which tends to simplify complex issues, narrows the questions and options, and permits urgent issues to override long term important issues) has led to the most open society in the world to support authoritarian dictators and military coups. In general, American operational national interests have dictated a reactive and regressive foreign policy in Latin America. Only in a few instances has the contradiction between aspirational and operational interests caused serious political friction. Even those policies which offer rays of hope for long-term justice have tended to impose the American common identity on Latin America as a means to other ends, not as an end in itself. Was the reason for U.S. support of the 1954 Guatemalan coup to build a foundation for democracy by tearing down an imposed communist government, or were American private economic interests groups (United Fruit Company) being threatened? The same question could be asked about the 1973 overthrow of Allende in Chile. Would the Alliance for Progress gone forward if Cuba hadn’t been “lost?” There is enough possible truth in both sides of the argument to not be completely sure.

Relatively recently (the past 30 years), new reforms in American national interest application in Latin America has taken place. Whether inadvertent (rhetoric leading to perception leading to policy), or by plan, the United States has begun to put democratization for democratization’s sake ahead of economic and less than vital security interests in Latin America. The same cannot be said for other part of the globe (e.g. Iraq). Most recently, a new group of policy makers has cautiously begun to accept instability for justice; Aquinas and Locke triumph over Hobbes. Our initial concern with democratization was of the “top down” version. Procedural democracy was imposed through elections in the hope that it would “dribble down.” With the recent wave of “bottom-up” democratization movements

in the last decades of the 20th century in Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Peru, Haiti, and the Philippines, the United States has sacrificed some political and economic interests in support of substantive democracy. These fledgling democracies are not required, as in the past to be a replica of the U.S. system of government, or mirror our political spectrum of party interests. In the past, U.S. policy makers viewed the Radical Party in Argentina (Christian Democrats) as too far left to be trusted. Not only are they now supported, the U.S. was a supporter to put pressure on the IMF and the World Bank to refinance Argentina’s foreign debt at a loss to U.S. financiers. The Madisonian Model is also at work on the issue of the Central American imbroglio. The most recent synthesis has opened political space that has brought the Central American nations closer to peaceful progress that they ever have been in three decades. Restraint and reform have begun to replace reaction and regression.